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I. INTRODUCTION 
Statistical procedures constructed according to traditional frequen-
tist criteria alone can suffer from poor conditional behavior. A condi-
tional frequentist criterion, based on a theory of relevant betting 
strategies, can provide an objective framework for assessing conditional 
performance. Previous authors have advocated conditional confidence prin-
ciples based on this theory, and it is argued here that even stronger 
conditional criteria are needed. Some examples are given to substantiate 
this claim, and procedures which satisfy the stronger conditional require-
ment, and hence are conditionally acceptable, are given. 
A frequent2st solutzon is a solution to a statistical problem that has 
associated with it some guaranteed long-run property. In particular, for 
the problem of interval estimation a frequentist solution is a confidence 
interval that has a minimum coverage guarantee. If Xl9 - f(XI9), a proce-
dure C(X) is a frequentist solution to the interval estimation problem if 
for some ~. O<a<l, 
where 
P9 [9EC(X)] = f I(9EC(x)]f(xl9)dx 
X 
Why are frequentist solutions desirable? The obvious reason is that 
the long-run guarantee is comforting - one gets some assurance of repeat-
ability of results. Another nice feature is that the frequentistsolution 
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gives a pre-experimental guarantee: one can set-up an experiment to yield 
a required precision, and know the effort required to get such precision. 
Problems arise with frequentist solutions post-experimentally, 
however, in that a perceived post-experimental precision can be quite 
different from the frequentist pre-experimental precision. Here are two 
examples: 
ExampJe ]. The Seidenfeld-Mayo Controversy 
Seidenfeld and Mayo, two Philosophers of Inference, have argued 
about the following set-up: 
Let Xl9 -Uniform (O,e). The best (Neyman-Shortest) 1-~ con-
fidence interval, based on one observation Xmx, is given by 
x s e s x/~. 
Yet, if it is known that 9S15, and X=10 is observed, then with 
~·.05 the realized 95% interval is 
10 s a s 200, 
which, of course, has a 100% probability of containing the true 
9. Note that truncating the interval at 9•15 does not remedy 
this discrepancy. 
ExampJe 2. (Berger and Wolpert, 1984) Let X1 ,X2 be independent with 
The confidence set 
= {the 
the 
satisfies 
but 
ve 
and 
These examples illustrate that ''good" frequentist solutions can have 
peculiar post-data interpretations. By only concentrating on long-run 
properties, aberrant per-trial behavior may be masked. One solution to the 
elimination of aberrant per-trial behavior is the augmentation of frequency 
theory with a theory of conditional inference. This idea is not new, and 
different types of conditional inference have been exposed by many authors 
(e.g., Fisher, Buehler, Kiefer, Robinson, Bondar, Fraser). It will be seen 
that the betting-based theory of Buehler (1959), formalized by Robinson 
(1979a,b) provides a reasonable augmentation of frequentist theory. 
II. CONDITIONAL INFERENCE 
Robinson's formalization of Buehler's ideas is both rigorous and 
general. While some rigor will be maintained, the situation considered 
here will be somewhat specialized. Most ideas, however, will carry over to 
a more general setting. 
We suppose that a series of trials takes place where a random variable 
X- f(xja) is observed, where f(xj9) is a known density function. Given 
Xcx, the frequentist constructs a confidence region, C(x), fore, with 
confidence coefficient 1-a. (Robinson allows 1-a to depend on x, which 
could also be done here, but right now that is tangential to the current 
concern. The quantity 1-a is the pre-experimental confidence, and the 
present concern is with its post-experimental validity. That is, can the 
frequen~1s~ confidence coefficient have a meaningful conditional interpre-
tation?) Seeing x and C(x), a bettor is allowed to place bets, at odds 
1-a:a, as to whether or not 9 is covered. The bettor places his bets accord-
ing to a betting function s(X), which will be taken here to be a signed 
indicator function, with + denoting a bet for coverage and - denoting a bet 
against coverage. (Robinson allows s(X) to be any bounded function.) For 
example, the betting strategy s(X) • -I(XEA) says to bet against coverage 
if XEA, the bettor risking a to win 1-a. 
Oef1n1~1on: A betting strategy s(X) is reJevanc for the confidence 
procedure <C(X),l-a>, if for some e>O 
E9{I[9EC(X)]- (1-a)}s(X) ~ eE9 js(X)I, Ve . 
In terms of betting strategies that are signed indicator funritions, a 
relevant betting strategy satisfies either 
P9[9EC(X)fXEA] ~ 1- a+ e, V9 (positive bias) 
or 
P9[9EC(X)fXEA) $ 1- a- e, V9 (negative bias) , 
showing that a relevant subsec identifies a portion of the sample space 
where the conditional coverage probability can be bounded uniformly (in 9) 
away from 1-a. 
Before discussing confidence principles based on relevant betting, let 
us first examine why this set-up is a reasonable way to augment frequency 
theory. First, it is totally objective, requiring no prior input, so it 
falls within the overall bounds of frequentist inference. Secondly, it 
provides a means to assess per-trial performance of frequentist procedures, 
and also allows us to see how bad (or good!) 1-a is as a post-data measure 
of precision. Thirdly, the work of Robinson, Bondar (1977), and Pierce 
(1973) point the way to constructing procedures that are free of relevant 
betting strategies. (Such procedures must in some sense be Bayes proce-
dures, possibly against improper priors; formal conditions are given both 
by Robinson and Pierce. Proper Bayes procedures, however, in general 
cannot yield a frequentist guarantee, so only improper priors can be con-
sidered by a conditional frequentist.) 
Conditional confidence principles based on the existence of relevant 
betting strategies have been put forth by Robinson (1976) and Bondar 
(1977), among others. In particular, we have: 
Rob2nson's Principle: use no procedure for which a negatively-biased 
relevant strategy exists. 
The logic behind this principle is reasonably straightforward. The 
statistician generally does not worry to much about being conservative, so 
positively biased betting is really not that much of a concern. The ex-
ample of Seidenfeld essentially points out a positively biased set, 
Example 1 (Continued). If X~ 3/4, then X/.05 ~ 15. For the .95 
confidence interval (X,X/.05), if 9 S 15 then 
showing that the set {X:X ~ t} is positively biased. 
Robinson's principle can be criticized on logical grounds, and as.a stand-
alone foundational principle it fails. This is because one can always take 
an ultra-conservative procedure to satisfy Robinson's principle: The 
procedure <C(X),l-a> a <(-oo,oo),O> allows no negatively biased relevant 
betting. Thus, Robinson's principle should only be applied to procedures 
that are "good" unconditional frequentist procedures. 
Given these qualifications, the behavior of C(X) in Example 1 is not 
particularly troubling in practice. On the other hand, Example 2 gives us 
a negatively biased bet: 
Example 2 (continued). Since 
P 9 [ eec(x1 , x2 ) 1 x1 • x2 ] = • so ve, 
assigning a confidence coefficient of .75 to C(X1 ,X2 ) will allow the 
bettor the negatively biased relevant strategy s(X1 ,X2 ) • -I(X1 • X2 ). 
This situation is quite distressing, showing that if the data fall in 
the conditioning set, the coverage probability must be lower than the 
nominal value. The procedure is not conditionally acceptable. 
III. CONDITIONAL ACCEPTABILITY 
The elimination of negatively biased relevant betting insures that a 
procedure will not suffer from any serious conditional flaws. However, 
this requirement is not quite strong enough to eliminate all aberrant 
behavior. Consider the following: 
Example 3. Stein's Two-Stage Procedure (1947) 
Stein showed how to construct a fixed-width confidence interval for 
a normal mean when the variance is unknown. The procedure is two-
stage, and can be described as follows: Fix a, t, and n0 then 
1. Take a sample of size n 0 , x 1 ,···,x , from a population with 
no 
density n(p,a 2 ), and calculate s 2 , the sample variance, in the 
usual way. The final sample size is given by 
where [q] denotes the greatest integer less than q, and t • 
t is the upper Cl./2 cutoff from Student's t with n0 -1 n 0 -1, a IT 
degrees of freedom. 
2. Take additional observations x 1 ,· · • ,x and choose positive _ n 0 + n 
constants a 1 ,···,an such that 
I:ai = 1 ' al - az "" 
... = a 
no 
n 
s2 I: a2 = (J./t)2 
1 i 
(Such constants always exist.) The interval 
then has coverage probability 1-a uniformly in~ and ~ 2 . 
There are a few things to note about this procedure: 
1. One will always go on to the second stage, but if s 2 is small, 
i.e., s 2 ~ n 0 (,./t) 2 , only one additional observation is taken. 
This can be considered stopping at the first stage. 
2. Stein also described a modification of this procedure, using a 
slightly different stopping rule and eliminating the ai's. The 
1 n 
final interval was x ± J., where x = - E x . The coverage proba-
n 1 i 
bility of this interval is at least 1-a for all~ and ~ 2 • Al-
though this interval is more attractive from a practical view-
point it is harder to work with theoretically. 
The logic behind Stein's interval is straightforward: if the variance 
estimate is small, the true variance should be small and one doesn't need 
additional observations to attain a desired accuracy. Also, a theorem of 
Robinson (1976) can be applied to show that there are no relevant betting 
strategies. One should be concerned, however, with the conditional per-
formance of Stein's procedure given that you stop at the first stage (or 
take just one more observation). On this prominent conditioning set, the 
procedure's performance is not very good. 
Theorem: Let c5 denote the Stein Two-Stage Interval, and A • 
{n s no+1}, that is, A is the event that the procedure takes one additional 
observation, essentially stopping at the first stage. Then the conditional 
probability of coverage, P 2 (~EC lA), is-independent of~. and is a mono-a s 
tone decreasing function of cr 2 , with PCJ 2 •0(~EC 5 IA) = 1-~. Thus Pcr 2 (~ECSIA) 
S 1-~ for all (~,cr 2 ). 
Proof: Stein showed that the quantity 
n 
u • (t/~) E ai(x.-~) 
i•1 1 
has Student's t-distribution with n 0 -1 degrees of freedom, and can be 
written as y/s, where y N n(0,1) independent of s. The proof of this 
follows quickly from his clever definition of the constants a 1 ,···,an. 
Using Stein's machinery and the definition of A we can write 
PCJ 2 (~EC lA) • PCJ 2 (1E ai(xi-~ )I ~~ ln•n0 +1) 
=Paz( lui ~ tjs 2 s n0 (~/t) 2 ), 
since the event {n•n0 +1} is equivalent to the event {s 2 ~n0 (~/t) 2 }. Let 
xz denote a chi-squared random variable with v degrees of freedom. Since 
v 
we can write u 2 • (n -l)x2 /x2 with s 2 • cr 2 x2 /(n -1), we have 0 1 n0 -1 n0 -1 ° 
P 2 (~EC lA) = P(x 2 ~ ax2 lx 2 ~ b/cr2 ) (3.1) a s 1 no-1 no-1 
where a~ t 2 /(n0 -1) and b = n0 (n0 -1)(~/t) 2 • 
It is straightforward to establish that 
where the last equality follows from the definition of a. 
L'Hopital's rule, we have 
P z(~EC lA) • 0 . (J s 
( 3. 2) 
Also, using 
(3. 3) 
To show that the conditional coverage probability is decreasing in a2 , we 
will show that the second derivative is positive at the zeros of the first 
derivative. This implies that any interior extrema must be a minimum. 
However, from (3.3), j_f there is an interior minimum there must also be an 
interior maximum, which cannot happen. Therefore, there are no interior 
extrema and the function is monotone decreasing. 
We can rewrite the conditional coverage probability as 
P 2 (~EC lA) • T(a2)/B(a2) , (1 - s 
where 
and 
ab/cr 2 
T(cr2) .. J P(y/a < X~-l < b/a2)f1(y)dy 
0 
and f ( ·) is the pdf of a x2 random variable. At the zeros of the first 
v v 
derivative we must have 
T( cr2 ) .. T I ( cr2) 
B( a2 ) B I ( cr2 ) ' 
and straightforward differentiation will show that 
At the zeros of the first derivative, the sign of the second derivative is 
given by 
sgn[B(a 2 )T"(a 2 ) - T(a 2 )B"(a 2 )] 
• sgn [B(a 2 )(!"~~:~T(cr 2 ) + B'(a2 ) d:2 P(xi<ab/a2 ))- T(a 2 )B"(a 2 )] 
= sgn [B 1 (a2) ~ P(x2 < ab/o2 )] dcr 2 1 
where the first equality follows by some straightforward algebra. Since 
B 1 (cr2) < 0 and P(Xl < ab/o 2 ) is decreasing in a 2 , it follows that the 
second derivative is always positive at the zeros of the first derivative, 
and the proof is complete. c 
A graph of this probability is given in Figure 1 for n0 -1 = 5,10,15. 
It can be seen that the probability drops off quite rapidly, going from the 
nominal level of .9 down to .6 for a=S. 
In the terminology of Robinson (1979a), the set A is negatively biased 
sem1relevanc betting procedure, which is defined exactly as the relevant 
procedure except that E is replaced by zero. 
Oefin1c1on: A _betting strategy s(X) is sem1relevanc for the confi-
dence procedure <C(X),l-a> if 
E9{r[eec(X)] - 51-a)}s(X) ~ o, lie . 
l 
0 
• u 
• E; 
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• c. 
Figure 1: 
Cond. Coverage Prob. 
df=5,10,15; z=.S 
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For Stein's two-stage procedure with 1-« • .9 
the probability of coverage, given that you 
stop at the first stage, is shown. The initial 
sample sizes are n 0 = 6,11,16, and the proba-
bilities are increasing in n0 • 
To require procedures to be free of all negatively biased semi-
relevant (NBSR) betting is, in many cases, too strong a requirement, and it 
would eliminate one of the truly great procedures. 
Exam'Ple 4 (Brown, 1967). Let x ··• x be iid n(11,a 2 ), and let 1 ' ' n r--
C(x,s2) be the usual one-sample 1-a Student's t interval. Then 
there exists constant k such that 
Although we cannot eliminate all NBSR betting, we can be selective. 
More precisely, in any experiment, we can identify sets on which condition-
al inferences are likely to be made. In the Stein example, or in any 
multi-stage example, we are faced with inference conditional on stopping 
early. In Example 4, the set {lxl/s > k} is the event of rejecting the null 
hypothesis lJ.=O, so the above procedure can be interpreted as setting up a 
confidence ~nterval after a rejection. 
The kind of confidence principle that these arguments are leading up 
to is the following: A procedure is conditionally acceptable if 1) it does 
not allow negatively biased betting and 2) If A is a set on which it is 
known that a conditional inference may be drawn (i.e. a stopping region), 
then A cannot be a negatively biased sem1relevanr subset. 
Such a principle eliminates both Stein's two-stage procedure and the 
t-interval-after-rejection, but does not eliminate the usual t-interval. 
IV. CONSTRUCTING CONDITIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS 
Requiring a procedure to be free of negatively biased semirelevant 
betting on a selected collection of conditioning sets is, in practice, a 
very cumbersome requirement. Although for some techniques (such as multi-
stage procedures) there are obvious conditioning sets (the stopping sets), 
in general an experimenter would find it difficult to enumerate all sets 
upon which there is concern over conditional behavior. It is sometimes 
possible, however, to construct confidence regions that are free of all 
NBSR betting. 
Example 5. Maatta and Casella (1985) are concerned with interval 
estimation of the variance of a normal population with unknown mean. 
Two of the intervals examined, CML' the minimum length interval, and 
CSU' the shortest-unbiased (or Neyman-shortest) interval, are shown to 
be free of all NBSR betting. 
How does one construct a confidence interval that is free of NBSR 
betting? From the work of Robinson and Pierce we know that Bayes proce-
dures are conditionally acceptable, so what we need do is verify that our 
candidate procedure is a Bayes credible set with credible probability at 
least 1-a. 
In particular, suppose X~ f(XIB) and <C(X),l-a> is a 1-a confidence 
procedure. Suppose further that there is a (possibly improper) prior ~(9) 
for which 
where 
PX[9EC(X)] = f ~(9IX)de ~ 1-a 
GEC(X) 
'VX • 
If A is a NBSR subset for <C(X),l-a>, i.e., A satisfies 
( 4. 1) 
P9(9EC(X)fXEA] - (1-a) S 0 V9 
or equivalently, 
then multiplying by ~(9) and integrating shows that 
Jf {P9[9EC(X),XEA] - (l-a)P9 (XEA)}~(9)d9 < 0 . 
e 
(4.2) 
( 4. 3) 
Note that this last inequality will be strict as long as (4.2) is strict 
for some 9 getting positive mass from ~(9). If the orders of integration 
can be interchanged in (4.3), we then have 
Jf {PX[9EC(X)]- (1-a)}I(XEA)m'II'(X)dX < 0 
X 
where m (X) is the marginal distribution of X. Comparing (4.1) and (4.4) 
1f 
gives a contradiction, showing that the set A cannot exist. Therefore, the 
problem in verifying the absence of NBSR betting reduces to that of finding 
the prior 1f(9) and justifying the interchange of integrals. (Note that 
since 1f(9) will most probably be improper, the interchange of integrals is 
not automatic.) There is no general prescription for accomplishing this, 
but it can be carried out in many circumstances. 
Example 5 (Continued). Using improper priors of the form 
it can be shown that CML and CSU maintain 1-a posterior probability. 
Example 6. 
p ~ 3, if X 
In the problem of estimation of a p-variate normal mean, 
N (9,1) then the confidence set p 
6 + C z {9:f9-6 (X)f S c} 
has uniformly higher coverage probability than the usual confidence 
set 
C0 = {9:f9-Xf S c} , 
+ 
where 6 (X) is a positive-part Stein estimator and c satisfies 
6 C is also a posterior P(x 2 S c 2 ) • 1-a (Hwang and Casella, 1982). p 
Bayes 1-a credible set (Casella, 1985). The prior used is an improper 
prior with the hierarchical form 
n(ejA) ( 1-A ) Np 0, ~ I 
-2 . A - A , 0 < \ < 1 . 
V. DISCUSSION 
Problems in conditional inference arise when the pre-experimental and 
post-experimental precision differ markedly. In statistical practice, we 
should be most concerned when the pre-experimental confidence is greater 
than the post-experimental confidence. Robinson's principle, elimination 
of negatively-biased relevant betting, assures us that there are no gross 
deviations in the pre- vs. post-experimental confidence. The above aug-
mentation of this principle eliminates more subtle deviations on sets of 
interest. It should be noted that the above augmentation of Robinson's 
principle somewhat reflects a concern of Bondar (1977): some conditioning 
sets may have low probability for most of the parameter space, so we may be 
worrying about events that are unlikely to occur. However, Bondar formu-
lates a different confidence principle which turns out to be weaker than 
Robinson's. The principle given here, while addressing this question in 
asking for sets of interest, leads to a stronger principle than Robinson's. 
The construction of conditionally acceptable confidence procedures is 
not easy, although it has been accomplished in a few settings. The elimi-
nation of NBSR betting on a selected collection of sets is a difficult and 
time consuming task. The blanket elimination of all NBSR betting, as out-
lined in Section IV, results in procedures that satisfy stronger condi-
tional criteria than required here, but it seems that this blanket 
elimination is the only practical means of assuring conditional accepta-
bility in practice. 
A final question to be addressed is what to do when the pre- and post-
experimental measures differ in such a way as to violate the above confi-
. dence principle. One can, of course, abandon the procedure, but that is a 
destructive rather than constructive answer. There doesn't seem to be a 
constructive answ~r to cover all situations, but the following illustrates 
some methods of attack using the Stein two-stage procedure. 
Recall that any procedure under consideration does not allow negative-
ly biased relevant betting. If there are sets of interest for which 
negatively biased semirelevant bets exist, this can be taken as a signal 
that the pre-experimental confidence is too high. 
strategies come to mind: 
Three possible 
1. Lower the pre-experimental confidence. (Note that this modification 
preserves the non-existence of negatively biased relevant bets.) With 
the pre-experimental confidence lowered, any semirelevant sets can be 
eliminated. One may choose a pre-experimental confidence based on 
Figure 1; specifying a maximum sigma will specify a minimum confidence. 
2. Quote different pre-experimental confidence for each of the identified 
negatively biased sets. In the notation of Example 3 and the Theorem, 
P z<vec lA) ~ 1 -a a s 
c 
P 2(VEC lA ) ~ 1 - a a s 
so the post-experimental confidence is greater than 1-a on Ac. 
Quoting a different pre-experimental confidence for A and Ac is a way 
to eliminate negatively biased semirelevant bets, and, in this exam-
ple, preserves the non-existence of negatively biased relevant bets. 
3. Modify the procedure. For a fixed a and n0 , use t 12 instead of v,a 
tno-l,a/ 2 ' where v < n0 -l. This modification eliminates the negative-
ly biased semirelevant set A, at the expense of increasing the length 
of the interval. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Traditional Neyman-Pearson theory contains no mechanism for evaluating 
conditional performance of its procedures. The theory of relevant betting 
provides an objective framework for doing this, and is a natural way of 
augmenting Neyman-Pearson theory to insure that resulting procedures are 
good both unconditionally and c~nditionally. 
Robinson's principle of conditional inference, to allow no negatively_ 
biased relevant betting, does not appear to be strong enough to eliminate 
all troublesome conditional behavior. The principle outlined in this 
article is slightly stronger, and leads to procedures with more acceptable 
conditional performance. 
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